User:Eawasyle

This is the start of my wiki page for Philosophy 409.02 group project on moral reasoning. The outline, could look something like the following:

1. Lay the groundwork for the dichotomy between moral reasoning approaches: a) principles to considered judgements, or b) judgements to principles.

2. Describe the major objection to a)

3. Describe the major objection to b)

4. Respond to the major objection to a) as if I were a proponent of a).

5. Respond to the major objection to b) as if I were a proponent of b).

6. Conclude with perhaps a choice that is justified by the arguments above, if a conclusion can be drawn.

Eric

--- Introduction (Eric)

Discussion concerning the methods of moral reasoning have occupied theorists and practical ethicists for considerable time. This web page will briefly describe the major objections of an approach to moral reasoning that derives from principles and then applies to particular moral judgements, as well as the major objections of an approach that uses specific moral judgements to provide evidence for general moral principles. Responses to each attack will be discussed, followed by a more unifying approach that we find plausible to account for the way in which moral reasoning occurs and can be justified.

A. Account for General Principles (Eric)

In this account, a judgement or belief is justified on the basis of appeal to a general principle or a set of general principles. A general principle, such as non-maleficence, or 'doing no harm', for instance, can be employed in health care decisions to justify withdrawal of life support from a patient who is suffering terribly from the ravages of a terminal illness with no hope for relief or recovery. Some judgements fall easily under a single rule or principle while others require appeal to more than one rule or principle that could be in force at the same time.

B. A major Objection to the Account for General Principles (Eric)

The major objection to the account for General Principles as the method for moral reasoning lies in the complexity of moral decisions. If moral decisions were subject simply to general principles, then uniform decisions would be easily accessible to all people, who by application of the general principle, would derive the same judgement. Experience shows us that it is rarely the case that moral decisions can be so easily judged. It is precisely the conflict between competing principles and imperatives that produces decisional conflict and the need for moral deliberation. The specification and balancing of norms within a social context where a moral decision is to be applied, cultural history and practices, known facts about the world, precedents, and predictions of consequences are all aspects of complexity that impact moral judgements in a particular circumstance (Beauchamp and Childress).

General principles are meant to apply broadly and can be too general to assist in a particular moral decision or judgement. This can happen when the case is complex and requires attention to a number of general principles that might apply, but in conflicting ways. For instance, and returning to the previous example, the principles of distributive justice (here meaning appropriate utilization of scarce health care resources), of beneficence (applying techniques in the benefit of the patient, and of respect for autonomy (treating the person according to their competently determined self-wishes)all might apply, among other principles, to the decision regarding maintenance of life support.  By appealing to the various possible general principles, a range of judgements that might look very different from one another can result depending on the balance of the potentially conflicting principles.  Appeal to principles does not come with an agreed upon rank-ordering of the importance of each principle. It can be argued, therefore, that the inherent non-specificity of the principles (that are meant to cover a very broad range of potential judgements) renders them to be of marginal utility in actually determining a right, or moral, course of action.

According to a summary by Timmons, a view called 'particularism' rejects the notion of moral principles by appealing to 'reasons holism' in which the details of a particular situation is what determines what should count as reasons for a particular moral stance. This view rejects moral principles as being useful since appeal to the principles implies that properties inherent in the principles will always be morally relevant and relevant in the same ways for all circumstances. This leads to a conclusion that the the generalized principle is merely trivial in its utility for moral decision making. Patricularists argue that trained moral perception of the particular and morally relevant aspects of a situation is the mode by which a moral belief can be justified.

O'Neill summarizes two main objections to the view of universal principles holding for everyone and applying to all in the same way. The first objection is that such principles will be too general and abstract to be useful in providing guidance for moral judgements. The second objection is that the principles, to be in force, will be so prescriptive and demanding that they need be applied without attention to the relevant differences in situations, and will not confer any semblance of moral agency to a person trying to judge the morality of an act or a set of choices.

Dancy allows that balancing between principles must occur in situations of moral decisional conflicts, but argues that it is the particular features of the considered cases that are being judged or discerned rather than principles themselves. The moral decision is dependent on specific context, rather than on blind commitment to an identified moral principle. Further, he argues that a feature or principle that determines support for a particular action on one occasion but that leads to rejection of the action or to an alternative action on another occasion demonstrates the difficulty in ascribing the concept of 'principle' or of universalizability to that feature.

Beauchamp and Childress (p 387) attack what they term the 'top-down model' of appeal to general principles in moral reasoning. They assert that appeal to a general principle or precept is justified only by appeal to a further level of principle. Since there is no self-justifying principle as yet elucidated, and if it is true that a standard cannot be justified until it is explained by a higher order precept, we can conclude that there are no truly justified principles.

References:

1. Beauchamp, T. and Childress, J., Principles of Biomedical Ethics, Fifth Ed., Oxford University Press, 2001 pp 384-413.

2. Scanlon T.M. and Dancy, Jonathan, Intention and Permissibility II, in Aristotelian Society: Supplementary Volume, no. 74 (supp), pp 319-338, 2000.

3. O'Neill, Onora (19980. Universalism in ethics.  In E. Craig (Ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, London: Routledge.  Retrieved March 3, 2006, from http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/L108SECT2

4. Timmons, Mark (1998). Logic of ethical discourse. In E. Craig (Ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, London: Routledge. Retrieved March 03, 2006, from http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/L045SECT4

C. An argument in defense of general moral principles (Jennifer)

It is important for one who endorses general moral principles that each person's moral obligations and rights are equal. This is of import because in order for a moral principle to be effective and useful, it must apply to anyone in any given situation. Kant, a traditionally influencial universalist, stressed that human reason is an autonomous source of principles of conduct, and that any act we deem as morally permissible should first be recognized as universally applicable to anyone else in the same situation (Routeledge, U in E5). More recently, R.M. Hare has taken up a similar view suggesting that having a reason to justify any action involves reference (explicit or implicit) to a rule, maxim, or principle. Rational principles make up the basis of our justification for morally permissible actions-- now, this isn't to say that the reason for an action does not involve reference to an individual. Both Hare and Kant alike stress that in no way does judgement play no part in the assessement of an act as morally right or wrong. Human autonomy and rational will equip each person with decision making tools, framed in accordance with rational principles. (F&R, 1963)

All this aside, there are many objections to the universalist's view on general principles. The most ambitious opposition comes from the particularist, who appeals only to judgement when considering morally relevant situations. One objection points out that in order for moral principles to be universally applicable, they are required to be so abstract and general, that in the end they may be applicable, but of no use. The criticism here is that general principles do not in fact offer much guidance. A principle that is meant to be generalized in order to apply in many different scenarios will also be open to interpretation, and this to a particularist seems to be saying the same thing he is: judgement is everything. The second most common objection involves a more specific principle, but one that is uniformely applied to all similar situations, and thereby insenstive to specific variables from one situation to another.

The way most universalists would respond to these problems is to explain that moral principles merely constrain action and entitlements to the realm of the 'morally permissible', and that they do not prescribe a deterministic line of action. They are intended to provide the same guidance to every person faced with a morally relevant question or decision, in order so that they can use their judgement in accordance with the plurality of moral principles (Hare, 1955). In Freedom and Reason, Hare compares his method of moral reasoning to the rules of a game: in no way do the rules of the game determine who will win or lose, they simple provide guidelines that each player abides by while making many decisions that will in the end determine who wins and loses. It seems equally unfair for anyone playing the game to cheat (or to play outside of the constraints of the rules), regardless of their individual circumstances.

The particularist claims that morally relevant reasons will differ from one situation to another, and therefore the utility of a generally applicable principle is negligible. But when determining the actual reasons for ascribing an act as right or wrong, the universalist will argue that the reasons one comes up with are the general principles that he or she promotes. An example of this, demonstrated by Singer, is the moral stance on walking away from a child drowning in a shallow pool. The human intuition seems so strong in judging that walking away from a child in need in this type of a situation is morally wrong, that it seems only natural that general principles can be constructed (based on these intuitions) in such a way that they apply to any person facing certain similar situations. (Singer, 1979)

So, the universalizability of a moral principle means that the same morally permissible act will be morally permissible in a relevantly similar situation. How do we interpret 'relevantly similar', and if I interpret it differently from someone else, then does it mean that the principle is useless? Again, Hare would say that as long as the reason for a person's original judgement is also the reason in the next situation, then the two situations are relevantly similar, and the moral principle can be applied (F&R, 1963). It follows from this basic concept (for Hare) that any moral judgement in which an act is deemed as wrong because of a certain reason (i.e. because it possesses the property 'A') then we can form the general moral principle that "any act having the property 'A' is wrong".

References:

1. Das, Kanit Lal. "Hare on Moral Universalizability: A Critical Survey". Indian Philosophical Quarterly. Vol.28, No.3, July 2001, 297-313.

2. Hare, R.M. "Universalisability". Essays on the Moral Concepts. London: The MacMillan Press Ltd., 1972.

3. Hare, R.M. Freedom and Reason. London: Oxford University Press, 1963.

4. ONEILL, ONORA (1998). Universalism in ethics. In E. Craig (Ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. London: Routledge. Retrieved March 09, 2006, from http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/L108

5. ONEILL, ONORA (1998). Practical reason and ethics. In E. Craig (Ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. London: Routledge. Retrieved March 09, 2006, from http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/L073

6. Singer, Peter. Practical Ethics. Cambridge: Cambrdige University Press, 1979.

D. An Account for Intuitive Moral Judgements

E. The major Objection to the account for Intuitive Moral Judgements (Carmen)

F. An argument in Defense of Intuitive Moral Judgements (Kurt)

Should there be an objective overriding universal morality? Or should there the focus be on a subjective individual level. Considered judgements are subjectively based judgements that can vary from individual to individual. Their basis is primarily derived from intuitions and beliefs we have on the world and are often formed from values impressed by society or from gut instinct. These intuitions seem to be able to give a moral compass of sorts, when compared with beliefs and values can give a seemingly reliable basis for moral understanding.

One method of interpreting intuitions is called reflective equilibrium. In which we balance our beliefs, judgements, rules, principles, values, etc. Revising as need be to come out with an acceptable solution to ourselves and acceptable in society. Moore uses this to give a seemingly reasonable way to interpret from intuitions a moral system of individual checks and balances to which we can live by.

Many intuitions give us examples of situations where the overriding ethical principles are seemingly wrong. Many examples, such as euthanasia, abortion, war crimes, etc. Examples of where intuitions appear to give better morality then those of the rules enforced on the people following them.

Part of the argument for considered judgements seems to depend on the intrinsic value of “good” or “evil” in certain acts and that all human beings have the capacity to realize the difference. Admittedly there are some who will argue the case against a morality based on the judgements and intuitions of the individual. This kind of objection finds its ground in that some people act immorally and seem to have no conscience in the matter of wrongness of the acts they commit. However this objection finds issue with the case when the intuitions of many individuals in a society give credence towards the innate good of human intuitions.

Hume’s arfument against objective moral theory goes on the basis of it does lack of generating a reason to act. If there is an objective moral theory that applies to all, what reason is there to follow it if there is no personal impact? By this reasoning, it does make the interesting question of can an objective principle that applies to everyone; really give us the initiative to take action to ensure it is enforced? Seemingly by this reasoning, any universal objective moral theory that ignores the subjective interests of the people to which it applies has no force to commit action in its favour, thus subjective moral theory and considered judgements must be taken into consideration.

This train of thought appears in the long run to give standing to the possibility that people that appear to lack a moral compass are deviants. Their intuitions that are based towards harm over help; these intuitions of what most would consider “wrong” over “right” cannot be considered acceptable for building a moral understanding since it will be infringing on the morality of those in the majority of a society. This following has the danger of running aground in the hypothetical case of “What if a society of murderers came about, then those who saw value in life would be considered immoral.” This case is flawed, because by basis in most social structures, a society based on what is commonly considered wrong cannot survive, since it would theoretically tear itself apart. A stable society can only exist where certain moral intuitions are common amongst its members. Without those intuitions being there, as stated before, humans would have destroyed our selves long ago. Some would argue that having such commonality in a group of individuals could indicate a principle that could be raised from the subjective to the objective. This argument appears to lose ground when faced with the fact; different people make different decisions despite having similarities between our intuitions on moral judgements

References:

1. Baker, John A., Lectures on Metaethics, © John A. Baker, Calgary, Alberta, October 1985, revised January, 1990, September, 1992, and heavily revised in October, 2005.

2. Mackie JL, “The Subjectivity of Values Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong” pp. 15-49, Penguin Books, 1977, 249 pages

3. Principia Ethica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1903; Revised edition with “Preface to the second edition” and other papers, ed. T. Baldwin, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993 (page references in this entry are to the revised edition).

G. An attractive Unifying Approach (Eric)

Beauchamp and Childress (p 397) report on the approach of Baruch Brody in which 'plausible intuition' is a first stage in moral discernment, followed by development of theory that explains and categorizes the intuitions, so that guidance can be provided in situations in which we do not have intuitions. They place Brody in the camp of bottom up 'casuists'and argue that in general bottom up (including inductivists) theories lack justifications for the use of general principles that could be used to evaluate with some objectivity the cultural traditions that may be in need of evaluation in determination of morality.

They argue that general principles and paradigm cases are neither sufficiently powerful enough to confidently allow us to ascribe moral ceertainty. Rather we use both or either, depending on the specific context in which we are making judgements. They appeal to Rawls' model of 'reflective equilibrium' to support their practical view of the moral decision-making world. Justification to hold a particular moral position is a reflective process in which we test our beliefs, past judgements, moral principles, theories, understanding of potential consequences, and any other moral belief, so that the potential judgement is as consistent or coherent as possible (and that leaves us with as little moral residue as possible). This reflective process, begins with considered judgements (which they define as "the moral convictions in which we have the highest confidence and believe to have the lowest level of bias" - p 398). Considered judgements can be about general principles or about specific circumstances. If aspects of a moral theory or a particular circumstance conflict with what we held to be our relevant considered judgement, we modify the judgement, the particular justification, the appeal to a specific principle, or our understanding of the principles, until we are again in a state of equilibrium. In this construct, the equilibration is an ongoing activity, ever changing to achieve coherence with what we experience in life and with what our minds can conceive of in the abstract. This view of moral reasoning resonates with our common experience. It also resonates with the manner in which we think, in which we come to have knowledge, and in which we test our knowledge against encountered circumstance.